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BUSINESS INTERESTS CASES-OCTOBER 2009 TERM
Honorable Leon D. Lazer* and Leon Friedman"
I. INTRODUCTION
HONORABLE LEON LAZER: The Supreme Court heard a
variety of business interests cases in the October 2009 Term. The
Term included several cases on the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"),' federal jurisdiction, antitrust, and a long-awaited case on
patents.2 The Court is increasingly hearing business cases, and this
The Honorable Leon D. Lazer is a graduate of the City College of New York, and received
an LL.B. from New York University School of Law. In his distinguished career, he served
as Associate Justice of the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second De-
partment from 1979-1986, and was a Justice of the New York Supreme Court from 1973-
1986. Justice Lazer has authored over 128 judicial opinions. Prior to serving on the bench,
Justice Lazer was a partner at the law firm of Shea and Gould and Town Attorney for the
Town of Huntington, New York. He is Chair of the Pattern Jury Instructions Committee of
the New York State Association of Supreme Court Justices. In addition, he is a member of
the American Law Institute, American Judicature Society, New York State, Suffolk County,
and American Bar Associations, and Association of Supreme Court Justices of New York
State. This Article is based on a presentation given at the Twenty-Second Annual Leon D.
Lazer Supreme Court Review held in Central Islip, New York on November 5, 2010.
Leon Friedman is the Joseph Kushner Distinguished Professor of Civil Liberties Law at
Hofstra Law School, where he teaches criminal procedure, constitutional law, First Amend-
ment law, federal courts and copyright. He is a graduate of Harvard College A.B., magna
cum laude, 1954, and of the Harvard Law School, LL.B., cum laude, 1960. Professor
Friedman has written briefs for the United States Supreme Court in over thirty cases dealing
with issues of Habeas Corpus, Criminal Procedure, Copyright, Civil Rights and the First
Amendment. Professor Friedman has published over fifteen books and over 100 articles on
various legal subjects. One of his books, The Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1789-
1969, received the Scribes Award as the outstanding book on a legal subject in 1970, and a
second work, The Law of War, received an award as one of outstanding reference books pub-
lished in 1973. He is also the co-author of a Broadway play, The Trial of Lee Harvey Os-
wald, later made into a television movie.
9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-14 (West 2010).
2 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct 3138 (2010);
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Rent-a-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct.
2772 (2010); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct.
2592 (2010); Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL (Am. Needle 1), 130 S. Ct 2201 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct 1758 (2010); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs.
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Term was of particular interest to those following the receptiveness
of the Roberts Court to business interests.3
II. CORPORATE DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP
The easiest case in the group, Hertz Corp. v. Friend,4 in-
volves the issue of interpreting the requirements for corporate diver-
sity of citizenship.' Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), "a corporation
shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been in-
corporated and of the State where it has its principal place of busi-
ness."6 But how does one define principal place of business with re-
spect to corporations like McDonalds, Hertz, Starbucks, and Wal-
Mart? The phrase is a rather anciently derived piece of language that
may not be suitable to present-day technology.' Until the decision in
Hertz, the phrase was interpreted differently by several circuits.'
Hertz involved a class action suit brought by two California
citizens against the Hertz Corporation to recover damages for viola-
tions of state labor laws. 9 Hertz removed the case to federal court on
diversity grounds, claiming that its principal place of business was in
New Jersey.'o The plaintiffs argued that California was Hertz's prin-
cipal place of business because it did more business in California
than in any other state." The district court agreed and remanded the
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct.
1237 (2010); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010).
See Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court; Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at Al ("The Roberts [C]ourt, which has completed five terms,
ruled for business interests [sixty-one] percent of the time, compared with [forty-six] percent
in the last five years of the [C]ourt led by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, who died in
2005, and [forty-two] percent by all [C]ourts since 1953.").
4 130 S. Ct. 1181.
5 See id. at 1185.
6 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(c)(1) (West 2011).
See Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1194 ("[I]n this era of telecommuting, some corporations may
divide their command and coordinating functions among officers who work at several differ-
ent locations, perhaps communicating over the Internet.").
See id. at 1185. Compare Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env't, 236 F.3d 495, 500
(9th Cir. 2001), overruled by Hertz, 130 S. Ct. 1181, and Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Rus-
sellville Steel Co., 367 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying the "total activity" test and
looking "at all corporate activities"), with Wis. Knife Works v. Nat'l Metal Crafters, 781
F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying the "nerve center" test).
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case to the state court.12 The district court reasoned that California
was Hertz's " 'principal place of business' " because the amount of
its business activity was " 'significantly larger' or 'substantially pre-
dominate[d]' " in that particular state.'"
In an opinion written by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court
arrived at a unanimous decision on the proper test for determining a
principal place of a business.14 The Court held that a corporation's
principal place of business is "the place where a corporation's offic-
ers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities. . . . [I]n
practice[,] it should normally be the place where the corporation
maintains its headquarters-provided that the headquarters is the ac-
tual center of direction, control, and coordination . . . ."15 That loca-
tion is "the 'nerve center,' and not simply an office where the corpo-
ration holds its board meetings (for example, attended by directors
and officers who have traveled there for the occasion)."' 6
The case was remanded to resolve where Hertz's "nerve cen-
ter" was located.' 7  But did that solve the problem? In this cyber-
space age, those who are directing the corporation may be in various
places, and the burden of proof is on the party asserting diversity.'
It may not necessarily be an easy burden to carry because the location
of the "nerve center" may be debatable in certain cases, such as
where corporations divide their command among officers located in
different locations. 19
1 Id. at 1186-87.
13 Id. at 1186 (quoting Friend v. Hertz Corp., No. C-07-5222 MMC, 2008 WL 7071465, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2008)).
14 See Hertz, 130 S. Ct. 1181.




19 Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1194. See also C.R. Wright, Supreme Court Provides Guidance for
Businesses Wishing to Avoid Unfriendly State Court, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS,
http://www.laborlawyers.com/files/25316_fisherphillips wright-hertzarticle_4BEB18C70
0002 1DFO7F469AA.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2011) ("When executives use technology such
as the internet to work and make decisions from home or other business locations, this may
cause problems if it is shown that the high level executives do not truly 'direct, control and
coordinate' corporate activities from one location where decisions 'radiate' to other corpo-
rate locations.").
2011] 201
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III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND TAKINGS
Five years after Kelo v. City of New London,20 where the Su-
preme Court decided in a five-to-four decision that a taking for eco-
nomic purposes was a public use taking,2 1 the Court heard another
takings case, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection.22 In Stop the Beach, a compara-
tively new judicial takings doctrine was almost born.23
Stop the Beach involved a Florida Act that established proce-
dures for " 'beach restoration and nourishment projects.' "24 Under
the Act, when there is a beach restoration, the state fixes a property
line as close to "the existing mean high-water line" as possible, and
that remains the permanent borderline. 25 The City of Destin, Florida
and Walton County, Florida applied to restore 6.9 miles of beach
eroded by hurricanes.26 Sand taken from under water was to be used
for the restoration, which would add seventy-five feet of dry land be-
tween the statutorily-fixed boundary line and the water, but the own-
ers would maintain their right of access to water along their proper-
ties.27 The effect would be that seventy-five feet of publicly owned
land would sit between the owner's property and the water.
A suit was brought by Stop the Beach Renourishment, "a
nonprofit corporation formed by .. . [owners of] beachfront property
bordering the project area[,]" claiming that the project deprived them
of their right to accretions and their right to have their property in
contact with the water.28 The Florida Supreme Court concluded that
the Act did not deprive the owners of their littoral rights. 29 The own-
20 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
21 Id. at 489-90 (relying upon over a century of jurisprudence to determine whether the
parties' "proposed condemnations [were] for a 'public use' within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment").
22 130 S. Ct. 2592.
23 See id. at 2601 (supporting a judicial takings doctrine) (plurality opinion); see also Da-
niel L. Siegel, Why We Will Probably Never See a Judicial Takings Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REv.
459, 459-60 (2010) (discussing the proposed judicial takings doctrine in Stop the Beach and
rejecting it as impractical).
24 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2599 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 161.088 (2010)).
25 Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 161.161(5) (2010)).
26 Id. at 2600.
27 Id. at 2599-2600.
28 Id. at 2600.
29 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2600.
202 [Vol. 27
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ers requested a rehearing, claiming "that the Florida Supreme Court's
decision itself effected a taking of . .. littoral rights contrary to the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution." 30 A
rehearing was denied and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 3 1
The case was important, not only for Florida with its exten-
sive coastlines and tourist industry, but also for the whole country
with its east, west, and gulf coasts and numerous restoration
projects.32 Developers, property owners, and the conservative Cato
Institute coalesced and supported the lawsuit. 33  Twenty-six states,
many municipalities, and environmental groups lined up to support
Florida.34
At the oral argument, there was much banter about hot dog
stands, port-a-potties, and blanket-toting tourists on the seventy-five
publicly owned feet.35 Justice Alito referred to the possibility of the
state creating a huge beach for televised spring break parties on the
publicly owned property. 36 Nevertheless, the owners' claim of a tak-
ing was rejected by the Court, eight-to-zero. Writing for the Court,
Justice Scalia concluded that there was no taking because the State
always has the right "to fill in its own seabed[;]" 38 the exposure of
the previously submerged land which would be scooped up with the
30 id.
" Id. at 2600-01.
32 See David G. Savage, Justice May See Homeowners' View: A Ruling on a Restored
Florida Beach Opened to the Public May Affect Laws Elsewhere, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009,
at 25 ("The high [C]ourt has never ruled that state judges have unconstitutionally taken pri-
vate property. If they do so in this case, it would give property owners a weapon to chal-
lenge rulings in many states . . . that give the public greater access to beaches and shore-
lines.").
3 Joan Biskupic, Fla. Property Case No Day at the Beach for Supreme Court; Homeown-
ers: Coastal Restoration is Government "Taking" of Land, USA TODAY, Dec. 3, 2009, at
2A.
34 Id. (noting that twenty-six states supported Florida).
35 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, 13, 46-47, Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-
1151), 2009 WL 4323938.
36 Id. at 39-40 ("Under the decision of the Florida Supreme Court ... [nothing] would
stop the city from .... hav[ing] televised spring break beach parties in front of . . . some-
body's house [and] . . . . as a practical matter . .. that [has] a real effect on the value of the
property[.]").
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restoration was like an avulsion 39-the sudden and perceptible gain
or loss of any land due to actions of water, such as a hurricane 4 0 -
which did not change the mean high water mark under common law41
and now the boundary line was fixed by statute.4 2
There was a second significant issue in the case. Can a judi-
cial decision itself constitute a compensable taking?43 Justice Scalia,
the creator of rules in land use cases like Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council," Dolan v. City of Tigard,45 and Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Commission,46 answered with a vigorous 'yes.' 47 He
summed up his position this way:
In sum, the Takings Clause bars the State from taking
private property without paying for it, no matter which
branch is the instrument of the taking. To be sure, the
manner of state action may matter: Condemnation by
eminent domain, for example, is always a taking,
while a legislative, executive, or judicial restriction of
property use may or may not be, depending on its na-
ture and extent. But the particular state actor is irrele-
vant. If a legislature or a court declares that what was
once an established right of private property no longer
exists, it has taken that property, no less than if the
State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its
value by regulation.4 8
Thus, in Justice Scalia's view, "takings effected by the judicial
branch are not entitled to special treatment." 49 "States effect a taking
if they recharacterize as public property what was previously private
4 Id at 2598.
41 See id. (noting that at common law "formerly submerged land that has become dry land
by avulsion continues to belong to the owner of the seabed (usually the state)").
42 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2599.
43 Id. at 2600.
' 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
4' 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
' 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
47 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion).
48 id
49 Id at 2601.
204 [Vol. 27
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property."o
In support of his position, Justice Scalia cited PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins,s involving a California Supreme Court
decision that overturned its previous position by holding that a shop-
ping center could not bar exercise of First Amendment rights on its
property.5 2  He also cited Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith,53 in which the Court found a taking when the Florida Su-
preme Court permitted interest on funds deposited pursuant to inter-
pleader to be taken by the County. 54 A better case would have been
State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,5 where the Oregon Supreme Court, re-
lying on the doctrine of custom, imposed a public trust-a position
that had not even been argued-and created a public easement on the
dry sand area between the vegetation line and mean high water. 56
Justice Scalia's effort was joined by three of his colleagues-
Justices Roberts, Alito, and Thomas. 7  The other four Justices did
not support the effort to establish a judicial takings doctrine." Most
of the pages of this case involve the debate over whether there is such
a doctrine, whether it is premature to deal with the issue in this failed
attack on the Florida Supreme Court decision, and why such a doc-
trine should not be adopted.59 Most of Justice Scalia's opinion is not
an exposition of the judicial takings doctrine, but an aggressive re-
sponse to separate opinions by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice So-
tomayor, and Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg.60 Justice
Scalia was particularly hard on Justice Breyer whose reasoning he
described as "how much wood would a woodchuck chuck if a wood
chuck could chuck wood."6'
50 id.
s' 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
52 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2602.
" 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
54 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2602.
s 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
s6 Id. at 676.
57 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2597.
58 Id. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that
"the plurality unnecessarily addresse[d] questions of constitutional law that are better left for
another day").
" Id. at 2602, 2604, 2608 (plurality opinion).
6 Id. at 2602-08.
61 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2603. Justice Scalia stated that:
Justice Breyer must either (a) grapple with the artificial question of what
2052011]
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In response to Justice Scalia's contention that the State cannot
do by judicial decree what the takings clause forbids it to do by legis-
lative fiat, Justice Kennedy's position was that the Due Process
Clause-the deprivation of property without due process of law-and
not the public use taking provision of the Fifth Amendment, is the
clause that applies in such a case.62 It would be anomalous in his
view to hold that courts implicitly can take property by changing the
meaning of property law. 63  And then, what would the remedy be?
The court reviewing the state supreme court decision could not enjoin
the takings under the Fifth Amendment taking clause; it could only
fix compensation.' Justice Scalia's view in this respect was that the
reviewing court could merely reverse and leave it to the legislative
body to "provide compensation or [merely] acquiesce in the invalidi-
ty of the offending feature[]."65 While the property owner in the
original case could only reverse a claimed judicial taking through cer-
tiorari to the United States Supreme Court, claimants who were not
parties to the original suit could challenge the alleged taking in the
federal court to the same extent that a claimant could challenge any
legislative or executive taking previously approved by the state su-
preme court.66
Justice Breyer's view was that thousands of property owners
litigate every year in the state courts and many of them would bring
federal takings claims in the federal courts.67 Federal district judges
would then be reviewing state supreme court decisions and perhaps
deciding that state supreme court judges engaged in a taking of pri-
vate property and fixing compensation. 68 "[Flederal judges would
would constitute a judicial taking if there were such a thing as a judicial
taking (reminiscent of the perplexing question how much wood would a
woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck could chuck wood?), or (b) answer in
the negative what he considers to be the "unnecessary" constitutional
question whether there is such a thing as a judicial taking.
Id.
62 Id. at 2614-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
6 Id. at 2615.
6 Id. at 2617 ("It appears under our precedents that a party who suffers a taking is only
entitled to damages, not equitable relief . . . ").
6s Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality opinion).
* Id. at 2609-10.
67 Id. at 2618-19 (Breyer, J., concurring).
68 See id.
206 [Vol. 27
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[thus] play a major role in [] shaping . .. state property law." 69 And,
as Justice Kennedy noted, if the state court stated it was only clarify-
ing existing property law-and that would likely be most cases-
what would be the standard for review? 70 Justice Scalia's response
was that review would be de novo.7 ' Both Justices Kennedy and
Breyer were of the view that there was no need to decide more than
what the court was currently deciding-that the Florida Supreme
Court's decision was not a taking.7 2
While Justice Scalia did not get the fifth vote he needed to es-
tablish the doctrine of judicial taking, the doctrine is now out front, at
least for discussion purposes. The four Justices who disagreed with
Justice Scalia seem quite unenthralled by the judicial takings doc-
trine. It is unlikely that judicial takings will become a reality within
any near future, but with four votes for it, it will surface again.
IV. ARBITRATION CASES
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,73
AnimalFeeds brought a class action antitrust lawsuit against Stolt-
Nielsen and several other shipping companies, claiming a price-
fixing conspiracy. 74 The actions against the shipping companies
were joined by others and, as a result of two judgments, the parties
were compelled to arbitrate based on the arbitration clause in the con-
tract. 5 AnimalFeeds served a demand for class arbitration,76 and the
parties agreed to submit the issue of whether the applicable arbitra-
tion clause allowed class arbitration to three arbitrators.7 The arbi-
69 Id at 2619.
70 Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2616-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
7 See id at 2608 n.9 (plurality opinion) (implying de novo review by stating that "[i]t is
true that we make our own determination, without deference to state judges, whether the
challenged decision deprives the claimant of an established property right").
72 Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court should not reach beyond the neces-
sities of the case to announce a sweeping rule that court decisions can be takings, as that
phrase is used in the Takings Clause."); id at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring) (disagreeing with
the plurality's decision to "unnecessarily address[] questions of constitutional law that are
better left for another day").
7 130 S. Ct. 1758.




HeinOnline -- 27 Touro L. Rev. 207 2011
TOURO LAWREVIEW
trators decided that class arbitration was permissible, but the district
court vacated the award as a " 'manifest disregard' of the law."78
The Second Circuit disagreed and reversed."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Circuit
decision, five-to-three.8 0 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito de-
clared the issue was "whether imposing class arbitration on parties
whose arbitration clauses are 'silent' on that issue is consistent with
the [FAA]."" He differed with the arbitrators, finding that no case
had ever decided that there could be class arbitration when the con-
tract was silent.82 It was his view that silence must be construed as
forbidding, rather than permitting, class arbitration.83 "[E]ven though
there is no tradition for class arbitration under the maritime law," the
arbitration panel regarded the agreement's silence on the question of
class arbitration as dispositive. 84 Justice Alito regarded that conclu-
sion as "fundamentally at war with the foundational FAA principle
that arbitration is a matter of consent."8 5 The Court thus held "that a
party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitra-
tion unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party
agreed to do so.",86 Justices Breyer and Stevens joined Justice Gins-
burg's dissent that the case was "not ripe for judicial review," that the
arbitrators had acted within their authority, that it was properly based
on New York and federal maritime law as well as the decisions of
other arbitrators under AAA rules, and finally that arbitration errors
are not a basis for disturbing arbitration judgments.
Six days after the decision came down, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in another business-to-business case involving cre-
dit cards, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant." The
Court vacated a Second Circuit decision holding that a class arbitra-
7 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1766 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.,
435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
7 Id.
80 Id. at 1767, 1777.
st Id. at 1764.
82 Id. at 1768-69.




8 See id. at 1777-79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
88 130 S. Ct 2401 (2010).
208 [Vol. 27
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tion waiver was unenforceable. 89 The implications of Stolt-Nielsen
on consumer class actions have been the subject of much debate. 90
What the effect of Stolt-Nielsen will be on consumer class actions has
yet to be seen and it will be seen at the next Term of the Court.
The issue in a second arbitration case before the Court was
whether under the FAA a district court "may decide a claim that an
arbitration agreement is unconscionable, where the agreement expli-
citly assigns that decision to the arbitrator."9' Section 2 of the FAA
provides, "A contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 92 The last clause, of course, implicates judicial interven-
tion.
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,93 an account manag-
er for the company had signed two single sheet agreements on being
hired; one involved the terms of his employment, and the other was a
stand-alone arbitration agreement, a provision of which referred all
"past, present or future" disputes including discrimination and federal
law violations to arbitration. 94 A second provision (referred to by the
Court as a delegation provision) declared that
The Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local
court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to re-
solve any dispute relating to the interpretation, appli-
cability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement
including, but not limited to any claim that all or any
part of this Agreement is void or voidable. 95
8 In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 320 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated sub nom.,
Am. Express, 130 S. Ct. 2401.
90 See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, High Court Ruling May Fuel Battle Over Class Arbitration,
NAT'L L.J. (Jan. 19, 2011) http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202453305424 (" 'If this
opinion means what [the defense bar] says, there won't be any consumer class actions in any
case in which the parties have an arbitration clause.' " (quoting F. Paul Bland of Public Jus-
tice, a Washington-based publish interest law firm)).
9' Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2775.
92 9 U.S.C.A. § 2.
9 130 S. Ct. 2772.
94 Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct at 2775.
95 id.
2011] 209
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Jackson who had signed the agreement as a condition of em-
ployment, was fired after three years and brought a lawsuit charging
race discrimination and retaliation. 96 The district court granted Rent-
a-Center's motion for a stay and to compel arbitration. 97 The Ninth
Circuit reversed in part, rejecting Jackson's claim that the fee sharing
provision of the arbitration agreement was unconscionable under Ne-
vada law, but held that where "a party challenges an arbitration
agreement as unconscionable, and thus asserts that he could not mea-
ningfully assent to the agreement, the threshold question of uncons-
cionability is for the court." 98 The issue, before the Supreme Court,
of course, was who decides that question, the arbitrators or the
court? 99
With Justice Scalia writing for the majority, the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, five-to-four. 00 Arbitra-
tion, Justice Scalia wrote, is a matter of contract "on ... equal footing
with other contracts."'o' The delegation provision to the arbitrators
to decide this issue of arbitrability is simply an agreement, and the
question is its validity. 0 2 In Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co. 103 and Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardeg-
na,104 the Court had decided that the question of enforceability of a
contract as a whole is for the arbitrator, but that the arbitration clause
of the contract is severable and subject to attack in the courts.'0o So,
if the validity of the overall contract is attacked as unenforceable, the
arbitrator has the authority to decide the issue of enforceability,106 but
if it is the arbitration clause itself that is challenged specifically, for
96 id
* Id
9 Id. at 2776 (quoting Jackson v. Rent-A-Center West, Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir.
2009)).
99 Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2776.
100 Id. at 2775, 2781.
"o' Id. at 2776.
102 Id. at 2777-78.
103 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
1 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
105 Id. at 449 ("We reaffirm today that, regardless of whether the challenge is brought in
federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifi-
cally to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator."); Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at
404 ("[I]f the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself-an issue
which goes to the 'making' of the agreement to arbitrate-the federal court may proceed to
adjudicate it.").
106 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 546 U.S. at 449.
210 [Vol. 27
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instance as having been fraudulently induced, it will be severed and
the court will intervene. 0 7
But, here the arbitration agreement stood alone and was not
part of the overall employment agreement, so what was there to sev-
er? The majority held that the delegation provision to the arbitrators
to decide the enforceability issues was itself severable, and it was the
employee's burden to prove the unconscionability of that provi-
sion.'08 Proving the unconscionability of such a delegation provision
is a difficult task, and Jackson had made no effort in that direction.'09
Arbitration is a matter of contract law, and the delegation to the arbi-
trators to decide a gateway issue constitutes an "additional, antece-
dent agreement [in an arbitration agreement that] the party seeking
arbitration asks the federal court[s] to enforce."'1o Unless grounds
exist for revocation of the antecedent agreement, the federal courts
will enforce it."' Jackson failed to make the requisite showing." 2
The dissent, Justice Stevens writing, noted that the arbitration
agreement covered nothing else but arbitration and that the majority
simply "pluck[ed] from a potentially invalid arbitration agreement
[an] even narrower provision[] that referr[ed] [a] particular arbitrabil-
ity dispute[ ] to an arbitrator[,]" and thus deprived the employee's
opportunity for judicial intervention.' Quite apparently, the em-
ployment bar does not want arbitrators deciding gateway issues. But
under an arbitration agreement that delegates the gateway issues to
the arbitrators, there will likely be very little opportunity for judicial
intervention unless the delegation to the arbitrators itself is found to
be unconscionable.114 How that can be proved is yet to be ascer-
tained.
V. PRINCIPLES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
PROFESSOR FRIEDMAN: Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
107 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404.
108 Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2779.
109 Id.
"0 Id. at 2777-78.
"' Id. at 2778.
112 Id. at 2779.
113 Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2786 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 2787.
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Company Accounting Oversight Board'15 concerned the issue of
whether the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
("PCAOB"), created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,"' violated
the Constitution's separation of powers principles." 7  The Act
created a board, the PCAOB, that would inspect accounting firms,
conduct investigations, create auditing and ethical guidelines, and
conduct disciplinary proceedings."'8 Every accounting firm that au-
dits public companies must register with the PCAOB, pay an annual
fee, and comply with its rules." 9
This case focused on the way the PCAOB was organized.120
It consists of five members who are appointed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), the members of which are appointed
by the President.121 However, the Appointments Clause of the Con-
stitution states that officers must be appointed by the President with
the "[a]dvice and [c]onsent of the Senate," and inferior officers may
only be appointed by the "President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments." 22 Thus, one issue the Court faced was
whether the SEC was a department for purposes of the Appointments
Clause, and if so, who was considered at its head.12 3  The Court
found that the SEC was a department and that its Commissioners, as
a body, were at its head.124
The second issue that Free Enterprise Fund raised was
whether the PCAOB must be accountable to the President.125 As it
was configured, the PCAOB was only accountable to the SEC, which
can remove its members.126 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Roberts concluded:
This novel structure does not merely add to the
11 130 S. Ct. 3138.
116 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
"7 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3149.
11Id at 3147-48.
"1Id. at 3147.
120 See id. at 3153-54.
121 Id. at 3147, 3163.
122 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
123 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3162-63.
124 id
125 See id. at 3151-55.
126 Id. at 3148, 3153 ("The result [of the Act] is a Board that is not accountable to the
President, and a President who is not responsible for the Board.").
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Board's independence, but transforms it. Neither the
President, nor anyone directly responsible to him, nor
even an officer whose conduct he may review only for
good cause, has full control over the Board. The Pres-
ident is stripped of the power our precedents have pre-
served, and his ability to execute the laws-by holding
his subordinates accountable for their conduct-is im-
paired.127
The majority reached this conclusion by examining the two
layers of tenure that exist to protect the PCAOB.128 It noted that un-
der those layers, while the President could hold the SEC Commis-
sioners accountable, he had no control over the PCAOB because that
control was solely in the hands of the SEC Commissioners. 1 29
Free Enterprise also claimed that the PCAOB was not accoun-
table to the President because of the double layer of protection.1'
The President had no power to dismiss members of the PCAOB for
cause.131 Justice Breyer, in his dissent, harped on this, stating that
"The Court . . . , by assumption, reads into the statute books a 'for
cause removal' phrase that does not appear in the relevant statute and
which Congress probably did not intend to write." 3 2 Chief Justice
Roberts concluded that it was true because the parties stipulated to
it.133 "The parties agree[d] that the Commissioners cannot them-
selves be removed by the President except" for inefficiency, neglect,
or malfeasance.134
Despite the argument that the PCAOB was not accountable to
the President, the Court ruled against Free Enterprise.135 In essence,
the Supreme Court interpreted the statute in such a way that permit-
ted the SEC to fire the members of the PCAOB for any reason.136
127 Id at 3154.
128 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3153-54.
129 id.
130 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3149.
' See id at 3164 (stating that Congress cannot limit the President's power with the dual
limitations on the removal of members of the PCAOB for cause as required by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act).
132 Id. at 3184 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 3148-49 (majority opinion).
134 Id. (citing Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935)).
135 See generally Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138.
136 See id. at 3161-62.
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This was the only way that the Supreme Court could find executive
control over the Board in a manner that would satisfy the constitu-
tional requirements of separation of powers. 3 7 The Court presented
a very elaborate analysis, noting that the President must control eve-
rybody performing executive-type functions, and included a list of
cases on this point. ' The Court concluded that the SEC is without a
layer of insulation; it could remove a Board member at any time and
would be fully responsible for the Board's actions.' 3 9 "The President
could then hold the Commission to account for its supervision of the
Board," and that would satisfy the separation of powers argument.'40
Thus, the PCAOB was a valid organization that could issue orders
against Free Enterprise.' 4 ' The dissent by Justice Breyer lists over
forty separate bodies of the executive branch that have exactly the
same structure as the PCAOB, meaning a Presidential appointment of
a head of one of these agencies can only be removed for cause.' 42
The Court faced a problem similar to Free Enterprise Fund in
New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB,14 3 where two members of the
NLRB resigned and the Senate would not allow the President to fill
the vacancies.'" The result was that the NLRB consisted of only two
people.145 The Supreme Court said that having only two people serve
on a five-member board prevents it from performing the statutory du-
ties that are required.146
VI. ANTITRUST
American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League 47 in-
volved the question of whether the National Football League's
137 See id.
'3 See id. at 3151-53 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Humphrey's Ex'r,
295 U.S. 602; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S.
483 (1886)).
9 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3153-54.
140 See id. at 3154.
141 See id. at 3161.
142 See id at 3185-3218 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
143 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010).
144 See id. at 2638.
145 id
4 Id. at 2638 (holding "that two remaining Board members cannot exercise such authori-
ty").
147 130 S. Ct 2201.
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("NFL") licensing activities violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. 148
In 1963, the NFL, comprised of thirty-two football teams, formed an
organization called the National Football League Properties
("NFLP") "to develop, license, and market their intellectual proper-
ty." 49 American Needle was a licensee of the NFLP, manufacturing
and selling products with the symbols of the NFL teams. 10 Howev-
er, the NFLP decided to have an exclusive license with Reebok to
prevent other suppliers from manufacturing and selling trademarked
headgear bearing any NFL team's insignia.' 5' American Needle
brought suit, claiming that the agreements between Reebok, the
NFLP, the NFL, and its teams violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. 15 2
The specific issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
NFL was a single entity for antitrust purposes or whether it was thir-
ty-two separate entities.1 53 If the NFL was a single entity, then the
agreements did not constitute a violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. 154 The Seventh Circuit found that the NFL was a single entity
and therefore, concluded there was no antitrust violation because of
the joint effort between the teams. 5 5 The Supreme Court disagreed,
reasoning that "[t]he teams compete with one another, not only on the
playing field, but to attract fans, for gate receipts and for contracts
with managerial and playing personnel[,]" and they "compete in the
market for intellectual property."' 56 This case serves as an important
reminder to sports teams that they must pay close attention to the an-
titrust laws. 15
148 Id. at 2206-07.
149 Id. at 2207.
Is' Id.
151 Id.
152 Am. Needle I, 130 S. Ct. at 2207. See also Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2 (West
2010).
15 Am. Needle 1, 130 S. Ct. at 2208 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984)).
154 Id. at 2207.
"s Id. at 2207-08 (citing Am. Needle Inc. v. NFL (Am. Needle II), 538 F.3d 736, 741 (7th
Cir. 2008), Am. Needle Inc. v. New Orleans Louisiana Saints (Am. Needle Ill), 496 F. Supp.
2d 941, 943 (N.D. Ill. 2007)).
16 Id. at 2212-13 (citing Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 249 (1996); Sullivan
v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1098 (1st Cir. 1994); Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 787
(3d Cir. 1983)).
1s7 See David G. Savage, High Court Rules Against NFL in Antitrust Suit: The Justices
Revive a Case that Challenged a Marketing Deal for Team Merchandise, L.A. TIMES, May
25, 2010, at 2 (noting that the decision "deal[t] a setback to sports leagues that seek to close-
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VII. PATENTS
Bilski v. Kappostss was the highly anticipated patent case of
the Court's last Term.' 59 The issue in Bilski was whether a business
method is patentable. 60  In Bilski, the specific business method
sought to be patented was a process for hedging risk in the energy
market.161 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit held that a business method cannot be patented unless " 'it is tied
to a particular machine or apparatus, or. .. it transforms a particular
article into a different state or thing.' "162 However, the Supreme
Court considered the test to be too restrictive.'6 ' The Court also con-
cluded that while there may be some business processes that could be
patented,'64 the particular method involved in this case could not.165
The Court reasoned that the process of hedging risk in com-
modity trades was a mere abstract idea and could not be patented un-
der any circumstances.166  Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion,
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, stated that there
were no circumstances under which an intellectual process may be
patented.167 The ambiguity of the Court's language as to the possibil-
ity of patenting a business method will no doubt have an effect on
businesses in the future.168
ly control the marketing of their teams and their spin-off merchandise").
"' 130 S. Ct. 3218.
159 See, e.g., John Schwartz, Broad View of Patents on Methods, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29,
2010, at Bl.
160 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3223.
161 id.
162 Id. at 3224 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
163 Id. at 3227 ("This Court's precedents establish that the machine-or-transformation test
is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed
inventions are processes under § 101. The machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test
for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible 'process.' ").
'6 Id. at 3228-30 ("[W]hile § 273 appears to leave open the possibility of some business
method patents, it does not suggest broad patentability of such claimed inventions.").
165 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229-31.
166 Id. at 3230.
167 Id. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court is quite wrong ... to suggest that
any series of steps that is not itself an abstract idea or law of nature may constitute a
'process' within the meaning of § 101.").
168 See Schwartz, supra note 159 ("The [C]ourt, by pursuing a moderate path, has left
much unresolved. . . ."); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3255-56.
The primary concern is that patents on business methods may prohibit a
wide swath of legitimate competition and innovation....
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VIII. COPYRIGHTS
The one copyright case of the Term was Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
Muchnick.169  Several years ago, the Supreme Court decided a case
called New York Times Co. v. Tasini.7 0 In Tasini, the Court held that
the copyrights of freelance authors were infringed when several print
publishers reproduced and. distributed articles to online databases,
without first obtaining the authors' permission 1 7 ' The Court rea-
soned that the work was not considered a revision under 17 U.S.C. §
201(c).17 2
Reed Elsevier involved a class action lawsuit brought by sev-
eral authors in federal court seeking to recover payment from the
publishers under 17 U.S.C. § 41 1.17 The issue was "whether
§ 411(a) restrict[ed] the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts over copyright infringement actions."l 74 In a decision written
by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court held eight-to-zero that § 411
was not a jurisdiction-conferring statute, thus the federal courts did
have jurisdiction over persons who had not registered their trade-
If business methods could be patented, then many business decisions, no
matter how small, could be potential patent violations. Businesses
would either live in constant fear of litigation or would need to undertake
the costs of searching through patents that describe methods of doing
business, attempting to decide whether their innovation is one that re-
mains in the public domain.
Id. at 3255-56.
169 130 S. Ct. 1237.
170 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
171 Id. at 487.
172 Id. at 488.
173 Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1242.
174 Id. at 1243. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Except for an action brought for a violation of the rights of the author
under section 106A(a), and subject to the provisions of subsection (b),
no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States
work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copy-
right claim has been made in accordance with this title. In any case,
however, where the deposit, application, and fee required for registration
have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registra-
tion has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute a civil action
for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served
on the Register of Copyrights. ...
17 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (West 2010).
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Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insur-
ance Co. "' represented another case in which the Supreme Court re-
versed a Second Circuit decision.'7 7  Shady Grove involved a class
action diversity lawsuit filed by Shady Grove against Allstate Insur-
ance in federal court, which involved New York State law.' 78 Shady
Grove brought the suit to collect unpaid statutory interest because
Allstate failed "to pay interest on overdue benefits." 79  Allstate
claimed that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction because New York
Civil Practice Law and Rule 901(b)18 0 does not permit class actions
to collect a statutory penalty.' 8 1
The issue was whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
23, which sets forth the requirements for certification of class action
lawsuits, conflicts with New York law.182 The Rules Enabling Act'83
states that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not abridge, en-
large or modify any substantive right." 84 Allstate argued that section
901(b) created a substantive right and therefore, Rule 23 violated the
Rules Enabling Act.'8 5 The Second Circuit agreed with Allstate and
held that section 901(b) created a substantive right that "must be ap-
plied by federal courts sitting in diversity." 86 The Supreme Court
disagreed stating:
In sum, it is not the substantive or procedural nature or
purpose of the affected state law that matters, but the
substantive or procedural nature of the Federal Rule.
We have held since Sibbach, and reaffirmed repeated-
ly, that the validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely
1s Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1248.
176 130 S. Ct. 1431.
1 Id. at 1448.
178 Id. at 1436.
'7 Id at 1436-37.
Iso N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2011).
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438.
182 See id at 1437.
183 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2071-77 (West 2011). Section 2076 was repealed by Title IV of the
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401(c),
102 Stat. 4650.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2072(b).
Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1443.
186 Id. at 1437.
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upon whether it regulates procedure. If it does, it is
authorized by § 2072 and is valid in all jurisdictions,
with respect to all claims, regardless of its incidental
effect upon state-created rights.' 8 7
The Court reversed the Second Circuit and remanded the case. 8 8
IX. CONCLUSION
The previous five Terms of the Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Roberts have been increasingly receptive to business cases. 89
However, not all of the cases were resolved in favor of business in-
terests, such as American Needle. Other cases, such as Bilski, did not
send a particularly clear message regarding important business issues.
Nevertheless, the October 2009 Term was an excellent opportunity to
view the continuing transformation of the Roberts Court with the ad-
dition of Justice Sotomayor. It will be interesting to see how the
Court will continue to take shape with the recent appointment of Jus-
tice Kagan.
187 Id. at 1444 (citing Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987); Hanna v. Plu-
mer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
.8 Id. at 1448.
189 See Liptak, supra note 3.
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